Pennsylvania v casey. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey :: 505 U.S. 833 (1992) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center 2022-12-15
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Pennsylvania v. Casey was a landmark Supreme Court case decided in 1992 that addressed the issue of abortion and the constitutional right to privacy. The case arose after the state of Pennsylvania passed a number of laws regulating abortion, including a requirement that women seeking abortions must receive counseling and wait 24 hours before the procedure.
The case was brought by a group of abortion clinics and physicians, who argued that the laws violated the right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the right to abortion, but modified the standard for evaluating abortion regulations.
In the majority opinion, written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court established a new standard known as the "undue burden" test. Under this standard, a law that imposes an "undue burden" on a woman's right to obtain an abortion is unconstitutional. An undue burden exists if the law has the effect of placing a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability."
The Court also held that the 24-hour waiting period and the counseling requirement were constitutional, but struck down a provision requiring that minors obtain the consent of one parent before obtaining an abortion.
The decision in Pennsylvania v. Casey was significant because it reaffirmed the right to abortion established in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, while also providing greater guidance on how to evaluate abortion regulations. It remains a key case in the ongoing debate over abortion and reproductive rights.
Pennsylvania: A Tale of 2 Caseys and the Death of a Pro
In this respect, the statute is unexceptional. In the early morning of January 13, 2013, Bradley drove his car to a store in Lowndes County. The District Court also found that in many instances this will increase the exposure of women seeking abortions to "the harassment and hostility of anti-abortion protestors demonstrating outside a clinic. In 1973, it confronted the already-divisive issue of governmental power to limit personal choice to undergo abortion, for which it provided a new resolution based on the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nebraska, Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE SOUTER announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI, an opinion with respectPage 844 to Part V-E, in which JUSTICE STEVENS joins, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV, V-B, and V-D. The Court is not asked to do this very often, having thus addressed the Nation only twice in our lifetime, in the decisions of Brown and Roe. The statute's parental consent provision is entirely consistent with this Court's previous decisions involving such requirements. The Court in Roe reached too far when it analogized the right to abort a fetus to the rights involved in Pierce, Meyer, Loving, and Griswold, and thereby deemed the right to abortion fundamental. But these facts go only to the scheme of time limits on the realization of competing interests, and the divergences from the factual premises of 1973 have no bearing on the validity of Roe's central holding, that viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions. . It was expressly reaffirmed in Akron v.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income. Decisions since Webster gave little reason to hope that this flame would cast much light. By selecting as the controlling class women This conclusion is in no way inconsistent with our decisions upholding parental notification or consent requirements. See Webster, 492 U. Danforth, Justice O'CONNOR, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice SOUTER, joined by Justice STEVENS, concluded in Part V-E that all of the statute's recordkeeping and reporting requirements, except that relating to spousal notice, are constitutional. Since I am convinced that a majority of this Court would likely hold a further facial challenge by the parties in this case to be precluded by the opinion and mandate in Casey, there is no occasion to consider here the Court of Appeals's broader assertion that, even in cases where a statute's facial validity depends on an empirical record, see Fargo Women's Health Organization v.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey :: 510 U.S. 1309 (1994) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
. Wade speaks with clarity in establishing not only the woman's liberty but also the State's "important and legitimate interest in potential life. Moreover, the statute requires physicians to inform all of their patients of "the probable gestational age of the unborn child. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives. They support the reasoning in Roe relating to the woman's liberty, because they involve personal decisions concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human responsibility and respect for it. This Court did not remand Casey to the lower courts for application of the proper legal standard, but undertook to apply the standard to the statute, upholding the constitutionality of most of its provisions.
Baird, Bellotti II ; Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. If indeed the woman's interest in deciding whether to bear and beget a child had not been recognized as in Roe, the State might as readily restrict a woman's right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further asserted state interests in population control, or eugenics, for example. However upsetting it may be to those most directly affected when one judicially derived rule replaces another, the country can accept some correction of error without necessarily questioning the legitimacy of the Court. East Cleveland, Roe, however, may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a rule whether or not mistaken of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection. The root of American governmental power is revealed most clearly in the instance of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United States, and specifically upon this Court. ISSUE: This case was brought before the court of appeals to determine whether states could more strictly regulate abortion. The 'bodily injury' exception could not be invoked by a married woman whose husband, if notified, would, in her reasonable belief, threaten to a publicize her intent to have an abortion to family, friends or acquaintances; b retaliate against her in future child custody or divorce proceedings; c inflict psychological intimidation or emotional harm upon her, her children or other persons; d inflict bodily harm on other persons such as children, family members or other loved ones; or e use his control over finances to deprive of necessary monies for herself or her children.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 1992
No person undertakes such a decision lightly-and States may not presume that a woman has failed to reflect adequately merely because her conclusion differs from the State's preference. The question then is how best to accommodate the State's interest in potential human life with the constitutional liberties of pregnant women. After analyzing the usage of "person" in the Constitution, the Court concluded that that word "has application only postnatally. It has unleashed a tidal wave that has swept away the lives of millions of defenseless, innocent unborn children. Given these premises, we find it imperative to review once more the principles that define the rights of the woman and the legitimate authority of the State respecting the termination of pregnancies by abortion procedures.
writing de jure » PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Akron I, Thornburgh and Akron I which, in our view, are inconsistent with Roe's statement that the State has a legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn, see infra, at 882-883, the central premise of those cases represents an unbroken commitment by this Court to the essential holding of Roe. If the case is so viewed, then there clearly has been no erosion of its central determination. To promote the State's interest in potential life throughout pregnancy, the State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is informed. A woman who decides to terminate her pregnancy is entitled to the same respect as a woman who decides to carry the fetus to term. United States, Perry v. They begin by noting that only about 20 percent of the women who obtain abortions are married. Consideration of the fundamental constitutional question resolved by Roe v.
In light of all of these facts, I conclude that the information requirements in § 3205 a 1 ii and §§ 3205 a 2 i - iii do not serve a useful purpose and thus constitute an unnecessary—and therefore undue —burden on the woman's constitutional liberty to decide to terminate her pregnancy. This characterization of the issue thus allows THE CHIEF JUSTICE quickly to discard the joint opinion's reliance argument by asserting that "reproductive planning could take virtually immediate account of" a decision overruling Roe. The decision to terminate or continue a pregnancy has no less an impact on a woman's life than decisions about contraception or marriage. Should these women become pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not wishing to inform their husbands of their decision to obtain an abortion. Baird, supra, at 453 emphasis in original. At the same time, the viability standard takes account of the undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves into its postnatal form, and as it loses its dependence on the uterine environment, the State's interest in the fetus' potential human life, and in fostering a regard for human life in general, becomes compelling. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit went almost entirely toward the opposite direction, upholding all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.
The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives. Even if reliance could be claimed on that unrealistic assumption, the argument might run, any reliance interest would be de minimis. Such a requirement arguably furthers the State's interests in two ways, neither of which is constitutionally permissible. Even when jurists reason from shared premises, some disagreement is inevitable. Because we set forth a standard of general application to which we intend to adhere, it is important to clarify what is meant by an undue burden.
Planned Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
The trimester framework suffers from these basic flaws: in its formulation, it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman's interest; and in practice, it undervalues the State's interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe. In sum, I would affirm the judgment in No. In all, the Court reaffirmed the essential principles of Roe while also allowing states to impose requirements on the abortion process just so long as they do not cause an undue burden on the woman. A wife may not elect to notify her husband of her intention to have an abortion for a variety of reasons, including the husband's illness, concern about her own health, the imminent failure of the marriage, or the husband's absolute opposition to the abortion. The second reason is that the concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman. First, compelled continuation of a pregnancy infringes upon a woman's right to bodily integrity by imposing substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of physical harm. But, as the Court of Appeals found, the state of our post- Roe decisional law dealing with the regulation of abortion is confusing and uncertain, indicating that a reexamination of that line of cases is in order.
