Eliminative materialism is a philosophical position that holds that our common-sense understanding of the mental states and processes, such as beliefs, desires, and emotions, is fundamentally flawed and should be replaced with a physical account. According to eliminative materialists, these mental states and processes do not actually exist and should be eliminated from our ontology, or the set of things that exist in the world. Instead, they argue that all mental phenomena can be reduced to and explained by the operations of the brain and the rest of the nervous system.
However, there are several arguments against eliminative materialism that have been put forth by philosophers and scientists. These arguments challenge the plausibility and coherence of eliminative materialism and raise serious doubts about its validity as a theory.
One argument against eliminative materialism is that it is based on a narrow and reductionistic view of the mind and its relationship to the brain. Many philosophers and scientists argue that the mind is more than just the sum of its parts, and that mental states and processes cannot be reduced to the operations of the brain alone. Instead, they argue that the mind is an emergent property of the brain, which arises from the complex interactions and processes that take place within it.
Another argument against eliminative materialism is that it ignores the subjective and first-person nature of mental states and processes. According to eliminative materialists, mental states and processes do not actually exist, and are simply epiphenomena, or by-products, of the operations of the brain. However, this view seems to contradict our everyday experience of having thoughts, feelings, and experiences, which are all subjective and first-person in nature. Many philosophers and scientists argue that this subjective and first-person aspect of the mind cannot be eliminated or reduced to physical processes alone.
A third argument against eliminative materialism is that it fails to account for the vast array of mental phenomena that we experience in our everyday lives. Eliminative materialists argue that all mental states and processes can be reduced to and explained by the operations of the brain and the rest of the nervous system. However, this view seems to be overly simplistic and fails to account for the many complex and nuanced mental phenomena that we experience, such as creativity, intuition, and abstract thought.
In conclusion, eliminative materialism is a philosophical position that argues that our common-sense understanding of mental states and processes is fundamentally flawed and should be replaced with a physical account. However, there are several arguments against eliminative materialism that challenge its plausibility and coherence, and raise serious doubts about its validity as a theory. These arguments include its narrow and reductionistic view of the mind, its failure to account for the subjective and first-person nature of mental states and processes, and its inability to explain the vast array of mental phenomena that we experience in our everyday lives.
