Locke of identity and diversity. John Locke Of Identity And Diversity 2022-12-27
Locke of identity and diversity
Rating:
8,8/10
451
reviews
John Locke was an English philosopher who is known for his contributions to the field of political philosophy and his theories on the nature of identity and diversity. In his works, Locke argued that individuals have a natural right to life, liberty, and property, and that the purpose of government is to protect these rights.
One of Locke's most significant contributions to the understanding of identity and diversity is his theory of personal identity. According to Locke, personal identity is defined by the continuity of one's consciousness, or the self. He believed that the self is composed of the memories, thoughts, and perceptions that a person experiences over time, and that these experiences are what give a person their unique identity.
Locke also argued that personal identity is not determined by physical characteristics or any particular object or substance, but rather by the continuity of consciousness. This means that a person's identity is not determined by their body or their possessions, but rather by their experiences and the memories that they have of those experiences.
In terms of diversity, Locke believed that individuals are naturally diverse and that this diversity is a fundamental aspect of human nature. He argued that this diversity is a source of strength and creativity, and that it should be respected and valued. Locke also believed that the diversity of individuals is what allows for the creation of a harmonious society, as different perspectives and experiences can lead to a more well-rounded understanding of the world.
Overall, Locke's theories on the nature of identity and diversity have had a significant impact on the way that we think about ourselves and our relationships with others. His ideas about the importance of individuality and the value of diversity have influenced many philosophical and political movements throughout history, and continue to be relevant today.
About Identity and Diversity
Cockburn pens her Defence of Mr. On top of this, there are deep and long-standing micro-level debates amongst those who think Locke is giving us some metaphysics in L-N 2. A human is an animal and, therefore, a living body of a certain type. For, though these three sorts of substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place, yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of. This concept of identity arises from the principle that two things of the same kind cannot exist in the same place at the same time, thus, no two things can have the same beginning or can any thing have two beginnings. First however, I must define the distinction between 'person' and 'man. And to punish Socrates waking, for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of Right, than to punish one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such Twins have been seen.
Next
John Locke On Identity and Diversity Flashcards
The imaginary cases that Locke employs are not dissimilar to ancient cases, such as the Ship of Theseus, reported by Plutarch. Just after Locke describes this scenario, he says, I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and the same Man, stand for one and the same thing. Locke takes thought to be immaterial, and while Locke contends that the immaterial cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the material, Locke is not committed to substance dualism, when it comes to finite thinkers. Different substances might all partake in a single consciousness and thereby be united into one person, just as different bodies can enter into the same life and thereby be united into one animal, whose identity is preserved throughout that change of substances by the unity of the single continued life. Other Locke scholars defend substance readings of Locke on persons.
Next
John Locke Identity And Diversity Analysis
Brody, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. But to be the same person you were at some time in the past you must have a present mental state memory of that past mental state. Reprint, Toronto: Dover Publications, 2005. Although many believe that the future will be like the past, Hume says the truth of that belief is not self-evident. This and other similar objections are meant to show that if we place the identity of persons in the identity of consciousness, as Locke suggests, then we run into a problem—namely one of contradiction—for we get the result that C and A both are, and are not, identical. Such scholars thus see what Locke is doing in L-N 2. Thus it is not only the case that we fail to have an idea of the self, according to Hume, but also the case that, properly speaking, no subsisting self persists from one moment to the next.
Next
John Locke 'Of Identity and Diversity'.docx
He says, Now the word Person, as is well observed by Mr. Therefore, the general is the same as the boy at school. To start with the macro level: Some who fall into this camp see Locke making metaphysical claims in various passages throughout the text. Whence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him who was flogged at school. Whether such transfers have ever happened, we trust in God that it should not have for the sake of deserving reward or punishment.
Next
John Locke Of Identity And Diversity
Given the law of transitivity which says that if C is identical to B and B is identical to A, then C is identical to A , we should conclude that C the general is identical to A the flogged school boy. Since the physical body cannot maintain personal identity, Locke comes to the conclusion that it must be the psychological aspect of humanity that retains personal identity. According to Locke's description of personal identity these human beings are not considered "persons" since nothing can be discovered from their past in order for that individual to define their psychological identity. And to this consciousness one names "self". Thus, rather than surveying a number of instances, and drawing inferences from there—or utilizing the historical, plain method—as he claims to be doing throughout the Essay, Locke is doing something quite different in 2.
Next
John Locke
The body is commonly assumed to be part of ourselves because it essentially provides our consciousness access to the world. It is impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving that he perceives. Therefore Locke must be wrong. It is always like that with our present sensations and perceptions. I do not willfully disown one act and appropriate another; instead I accept what my consciousness reveals to me. A person quasi-remembers an experience if 1 the person remembers having the experience, 2 someone really did have the experience at that time, and 3 the causal connection between someone having the experience and that person remembering having the experience is the same as it is in genuine memory.
Next
John Locke, Of identity and diversity (book II, chapter XXVII)
When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure be it what it will that it is that very thing, and not another which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists IDENTITY, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. Psychological continuity, as Locke describes it, also insinuates that a person who exists at one time is indistinguishable with a person who exists at a second time only if the first person remembers some past experience that connects the second person to the second time. That may be a reasonable question, but it has nothing to do with personal identity. Now that I have explained and given an analysis of Locke's theory of personal identity, I will now evaluate the validity of Locke's theory by proving that his account of personal identity is incorrect. What makes a man be himself to himself is sameness of consciousness, so personal identity depends entirely on that—whether the consciousness is tied to one substance throughout or rather is continued in a series of different substances. But our thoughts and memories are brought to mind individually and temporarily, and this causes the doubt. Reprint, Toronto: Dover Publications, 2005.
Next
John Locke
In Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments 1988 , Kathleen Wilkes takes aim at the proliferation of thought experiments in the personal identity literature. In this case, we are asked to imagine a ship that has slowly had its planks replaced with new ones. Other scholars tend to think that although Locke sets his task in the Essay as an epistemological one, he cannot help but dabble in some metaphysics along the way. If consciousness can actually be transferred from one soul to another, then a person can persist, despite a change in the soul to which her consciousness is annexed. Weinberg 2016: 153 The former is a momentary psychological state that allows for what Weinberg calls a momentary subjective experience that the self presently perceiving is the same as the self that remembers having once had a past thought or action and captures the first-person experience of persisting over time Weinberg 2016: 153. Reprinted New York: Robert Carter. Suppose a now retired lawyer remembers failing an exam in law school.
Next